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Of Law and the Revolution

Lama Abu Odeh

[This paper is not a “political science”, nor a “history”, nor a Jurisprudence paper. It is
more of an “analytical” paper that uses argument and conceptual analysis with a view
to heightening contradiction, tension and ambiguity on the relationship between
revolution and law, specifically as it has transpired in the aftermath of the Egyptian
“Revolution”]

Introduction

The Egyptian revolution is proving to be a very legal one. That is not to say that the
revolution’s demands have been legalized, nor that Egypt’s law has been

revolutionized, rather, the forces that have come to the fore since the toppling of
Mubarak in Feb 2011 have chosen law as the privileged form through which to
bargain with each other. The density of the legal back and fro has been

overwhelming: constitutional amendments, constitutional supplementary

declarations, parliamentary laws, legislative amendments, military decrees, court

trials, constitutional court decisions overturning laws passed, conflicting decisions
from various courts, presidential decrees, emergency laws annulled and then

reclaimed in another form; in fact so much so, that to trace the historical unfolding

of the Egyptian revolution, one would be wise to use the Gazette and law reports as

one’s primary guide through the maze of events. It is hard to miss the fact that in the
case of Egypt, no sooner the public space opened up for the political as an

autonomous sphere – one that is only possible through genuine democratic
practice- than that sphere became annexed by the legal.

Legalizing the Political and Politicizing the Legal

Ironically, just as the political forces turned to law and its institutions to mediate

between them and arbitrate their raging battles, in the way legal institutions can be
expected to, the Egyptian judiciary left its chambers and marched unto the public

space, turning itself into a public interlocutor, holding press conferences, appearing

in TV talk shows, making statements to the foreign press, explicating and defending
its decisions to the public, cajoling, forswearing, asserting, threatening, seemingly

participating directly in the political argument apace in Egypt since the event of the
revolution, sometimes openly privileging one side to the other (see Justice Tahany
Jebaly’s dangerous confession to the NYTimes as an extreme form). So while the

political forces have legalized their bargaining maneuvers, the judiciary politicized
its role, so that whatever cover of “law” the political forces sought to acquire from
the judiciary, the judiciary seemed to refuse to grant it, as if by denying itself the

veneer of “objectivity and neutrality”, the public performance that sustains its high
social status and privileges per judiciary, it has chosen to blow the cover of the

political forces, call their bluff so to speak!

The public watched the national judiciary closely and longing for a just and

“revolutionary” resolution of the persistent political uncertainty and angst hanging

over the skies of Egypt since the revolution like a stubborn dark cloud, and which it
had idealistically hoped “law” could clear, quickly surmised this was the “corrupt”

judiciary of Mubarak – dependent, abject, self-interested, incompetent, etc. Having

failed to provide the “revolutionary” answer to the political stuck-ness of post-

revolutionary Egypt, the judiciary quickly turned itself into the very cause for
revolution.

It was a bit more complicated of course. The judiciary’s performance had sufficient
nuance, its failure to satisfy “revolutionary” desire in the law interspersed with

some successes that some lawyers kept coming back knocking on the courts’ gates.

Sometimes, it seemed that what was driving litigants was not any faith in the courts
themselves, rather an idealized rule-of-law state that they hoped would suddenly
metamorphose before their eyes if only they kept the hope up and kept coming
back.

The legalization of political battles and the public scandal of the Egyptian judiciary’s

failure to return the “revolutionary” answer that the public longed for seemed to
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have turned every newly politicized Egyptian citizen into a lawyer. If the rule-of-law

had to be out there but the judiciary refused to “pick it up”, then by Jove, Ahmad and
Adel were going to (invariably bearded), and they were going to tell anyone who

bothered to ask, and in legalistic terms mind you, how the court had failed to rule
legally (how it failed to take its own jurisdiction when it should have, how it took

jurisdiction it shouldn’t have, how it upheld the bad law about military trials, and

overturned the good law about parliamentary elections). There is something very
exciting about this popularization of legal talk, which one can see as a form of a

people “taking law into their own hands”, the layman demystifying the rule of the
“expert”, an in-your-face busting of social hierarchy with all its concomitant

privileges. Thus in a very short period of time, one witnessed in the case of Egypt, an
interesting way of assimilating the limits of the rule of law state, not through

critique as happens in the case of Western countries where the rule of law is “thick”,
rather through an overturning of hierarchy, where every citizen becomes the judge
and legal language is popularized, its technical mystifying quality flattened, made
simple and accessible as it is digested by the lay mind.

What Would a “Proper Judiciary” Have Done?

Was there something that the Egyptian judiciary could have done differently? Could

it have carried the day and arbitrated the conflicts between the political forces in an
“objective and neutral” manner as was expected of it? Could it have done it in a way
that was persuasive to the contending parties, and that allowed the judiciary to
claim the mantle of “autonomy” and separation from the executive and the
legislative?

Many decried the behavior of the Egyptian judiciary as symptomatic of a pliant

judiciary, a residue from the “ancien regime”, one that refuses to drop old habits,

that has simply replaced the old master of “Mubarak” with the new one of “SCAF”.
Many were persuaded that if the judiciary had behaved in a more autonomous
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fashion, the outcome of the legal battles would have looked altogether different,
landing more squarely on the side of the “revolution”.

But this argument seems to ignore the fact that a judiciary that is available to act

independently is one that has already been buffeted by a solid and robust political
sphere, one whereby the political forces would not have felt compelled to legalize
their primary political battles in the first place. In such a sphere, political forces

bargain with each other politically following background rules of bargaining that are
known to all; whether those rules were legal in the formal sense or merely

customary. In other words, an independent judiciary is only possible when the

judiciary intervenes to settle disputes among political players only marginally and
only when there is confusion either about the background rules of political
bargaining themselves or a dispute about how to interpret the outcome of

bargaining once it has taken place (even if each and every one of those cases has
high stakes). In these cases, the judiciary, no matter how high the stakes, can

intervene to shift the interpretation of the background rules or change the political
outcome by privileging one side over the other through its decision while still

appearing “objective and neutral”. It can do all that while not appearing as if it were
an actual participant in the political dispute. Of course, there will be a great deal of
grumbling from the losing side that will accuse the court of acting “politically” as
happened in Bush v Gore but courts usually survive the day because of the

marginality of such cases in the overall dock of the court. Of course courts especially
constitutional ones like the US Supreme Court deal with a great deal of cases with

high stakes and many that have massive political consequences such as the litigation
over “Obamacare”, but the instances in which political arguments are settled outside
courts are enormous and that one continuously hears about in the news. Politics
happens as of course, its basic outline clear to all the participants. When this

happens and courts are spared the burden of delineating the outline itself in a

society that aspires to be “democratic” then courts can “get away” with it. They can
get away with acting “independently”.
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In short, an independent judiciary can exist when there is already a lot of politics

going on. The quality of “independence” in a judiciary is not only a function of the
personal “virtue” its members would either enjoy or fail to. Independence in the

judiciary is a function of the social organization of the state, just as corruption of
state officials is a function of the economic and social organization of the state.

Under the Dictatorship

Of course such conditions were far from prevalent under the dictatorship of

Mubarak, where the judiciary as an institution was absorbed into the machinations
of power of the ruling regime. There have been periods and instances where the
judiciary fought the dictatorship: the High Administrative Court’s anti-Mubarak
rulings are famous and the period of the nineties in the life of the Supreme

Constitutional Court when the court took seriously the bill of rights in the Egyptian
constitution and issued many rulings that pushed for more democratic

representation in the system is a period that excited many Egyptians. Overturning
laws that cement repression or declaring illegal state actions that smack of,

unfairness, abuse of authority or corruption, and in the past twenty years there has

been several of those, does indeed signal gestures of independence by the judiciary.
But such acts of defiance, against a background of dictatorial rule and interspersed

with contrary acts of “compliance” by the same judiciary, signal less a thick judicial

sphere that is acting “legally” and more of a “political” sphere in which the judiciary
is carefully calculating its position, counting its gains and losses and basing its

judicial interventions accordingly. Because the stakes are high for the judiciary itself
when it stands up in the face of the repressive regime, its discrete acts of opposition
signal a deliberate political act of its own, as if underneath this veneer of upholding

rightness and legality it is acting no differently than the other political actors, using
the tools available to it, law and legal discourse, to scurry in and out of the political
scene. And since underneath the thin veneer of legality, there is a thick and
overbearing political consideration, one loses the sense that what is being

undertaken is a legal interpretive activity, a judge reading the law objectively and
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neutrally, as the rule of law ideology would have him do. In other words, one might
describe those acts as “independent” but not exactly “judicial” even though they are

issuing from a judiciary and in the form of court decisions. What is gained in acts of
“independence” by the “judiciary” is lost in the performance of “a separate judicial

sphere” because the element of calculation in the issued ruling is transparent when

judged within the overall context of the behavior of the particular court over time. It
is as if to be independent, the judge has to cease being a “judge” altogether!

Something parallel to that happens in the collective mind of the judges’ national

audience. Contemptuous of the dictator’s law and longing for justice and vindication
from an alternate “father”, it turns to the judiciary for respite. Not much attention is
paid to the laws themselves, to the nature of judicial activity, no interest in

comprehending the machinations of interpretations, the judicial interpretive ethos
that the judge sees himself as obeying even if only on the surface of his

consciousness. For the judges’ audience, “standing for” becomes synonymous with
“adjudicating”, “rightness and justice” becomes synonymous with “law”. Thus law
loses its most basic quality: “textuality” and judicial activity loses its most basic

feature: “interpretation”. It doesn’t matter how interpretively persuasive the judge
in a given instance might be, as long as the decision doesn’t correspond with the
“’rightness and justice” of the situation, the judge is not acting independently.

So the audience might feel vindicated and rejoice with delight at the specter of an

“independent” judge (the judge opposing the dictator), and the judge might savor

the popularity, but what has been lost in this moment of joint elation is the idea of
“judiciary” itself. It’s not just when the judiciary is compliant that it ceases to be a
“judiciary” in the proper sense, the same happens when it is exactly the opposite:
when it acts independently.

After the Revolution

While SCAF has replaced Mubarak as the remainder “authoritarian” representative,
the dictatorship no longer acts with the same robustness it had before the
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revolution. New political forces have come to the fore as a result of the revolution,
especially the Islamic ones, whose absence was notable during the time of the

dictatorship. The loosening up of the political sphere should on principle allow the
judiciary room to maneuver as it doesn’t have to be beholden to one dominant
dictatorial force, and could therefore avoid being absorbed in the political

machination of the time. At least such a possibility is open to an “independently”-

minded judiciary, which I will define here as,“ inclined to be politically opposed to

the trappings of dictatorial rule”, which could conceivably emerge from the bosom

of the present judiciary. (After all, it is not uncommon to hear in Egypt, “There is no
independent judiciary here, though there are independent judges).

Different Logics

But this “born-again” judiciary finds itself confronting paradoxical and contradictory

demands, which even it were to call upon its most “independently” minded judges to
meet, it’s hard to see how it could possibly manage. It has to delineate the contours

of the political sphere anew, while acting “independently” of it. And while it’s at it, it

has to perform “interpretive fidelity” to the legal materials, as defined by the “rule of
law” ideology” without which it cannot establish its “judicial-ness”, i.e., its autonomy
as a sphere of the state. And on top of all that, its decisions have to correspond to a

revolutionary expectation of “rightness and justice” to make it all worthwhile in the
end.

Looked at more closely, two of those demands, “ judicial-ness” (interpretive fidelity
to the legal materials) and independence (from the political sphere) belong to the

“rule of law ideology”, while the third, rulings that “correspond with rightness and
justice” belong to the idea of “revolution”. This last one assumes that the judges’

fidelity is to the ideas of “rightness and justice”, principles that mobilized the people

to Tahrir Square. Whatever legal materials are before them, judges should interpret
those materials in light of those principles. In other words, in order to comply with
the principles, the judiciary has to immerse itself in the “politics” of revolution,
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forego interpretive fidelity to the legal materials for the benefit of fidelity to
principles.

“Rule of law” and “Revolution” therefore belong to two different “logics” that are in
tension with each other, even though, the one, “rule of law”, is often the historical

genealogical descendant of the other, “revolution”; and even though, and here’s the
rub: The demand of the revolution has been the “rule of law” state.

The Logic of Revolution

Arguably, revolution is the rule of law before the “fall”, or the big bang if you like. It

is when all the spheres are condensed in one, where their implosion has yet to occur
as independent spheres, where the text has yet to separate from “principle” and

acquire its maddening interpretive quality, where the “rule of law” state has yet to

be birthed. At this conjoined moment, the screams on Tahrir, “Life, Freedom, Social
Justice” yield their meaning without textuality intervening between their intention

and their words, when the revolutionary “subject’ is there to inform us of what they
mean, not in the sense that informing us is occurring “orally” rather than in a

“written” fashion (although that too!), rather that the enormity of the event in its
earth shattering transformation leaves no ambiguity as to what is desired. It is
when all that is utopian is real.

At that moment “law” doesn’t belong to the “rule of law”. It is something altogether
different as it is the simple working out in deductive fashion of the meaning of

“Bread, Freedom, and Social Justice”! It is when “deduction” is most transparent,

determinate, and necessary made stable by revolutionary desire that infuses the air.

The revolution hovers as a meaning stabilizer working as direct inspiration to “law”.
Not only does revolution remove the barrier of textuality from its project of self-

projection unto the future, it also dismantles all those other past texts that bedeviled
its subjects with its sadistic indeterminacy used by power to stabilize their
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oppression. Law that is good combined with law that is bad, a civilian court with an
emergency one, a democratically legislated law that is also a dictatorial one, text
upon text in which legality, as indeterminate textuality, produced them
determinedly and always as “criminals”.

The Revolution, as the set of principles that ”end all texts”, begins as a criminal act
against the state, in which one’s criminality in the eyes of the state and its law is

rudely and fearlessly returned back to the state with, “J’accuse!” The accuser (the

state) becomes the accused and the accused (the Revolutionary) becomes the

accuser. In this fashion, by staring the state “in the eye” when she had always been

stared down by the state, the Revolutionary puts the state in its “proper” place. We
all remember that famous lunge on the bridge over the Nile, when the multitude
lunged forward towards the riot police stacked up with their latest riot gear

supplied by the good offices of the United States, and much to their surprise and

everybody else watching, the police bolted back in fear. At that moment, the state
with its towering authority crumbled and the alienated powers of the collective
projected unto the state were returned back to their original owners with a

vengeance so sweet history had to record. Indeed, after that “bolt”, the rest was
history!

The Revolution is therefore doubly an “outlaw”/“law-that-is-out-there”: it

eliminates the legal texts of the state it “puts in its proper place” and it reduces law
into principle eliminating the textuality that typically haunts the gap between law
and principle in situations that are not revolutionary.

The Logic of the Rule of Law

Law is politico phobic within the Rule of Law. Its utopianism lies in its insistence on
a clean and clear separation from the political. For the “subject” of the rule of law-

the judiciary- Revolution smacks of the sphere of the political, where the messiness
and ambiguity of power and resistance take place. It therefore cares not for
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Revolution as an event in new time, only what Revolution has managed to pass in

legislative texts. The universals of Revolution yield no definite answer the judiciary
wishes to read. What principles Revolution may have enunciated have turned into
legal rules and that is the stuff of the “rule of law’.

And even though legal rules are framed in the shape of “universals” – generalities

addressing all, the equality of the rules is only formal: rules, whatever their content
might be, apply equally to all, no exception. The equality opened up by the

universals of revolution are on the other hand deep and cut through the formal flesh
straight to the substance of the bone: they are an invitation to “bread, liberty and
social justice” to all, no exception.

And while Revolution challenges the authority of the state by putting it in its

“proper place” so that revolutionary subjects can take back whatever power they
have projected unto it, the “rule of law” puts the power back in the state. Unlike

Revolution it is invested in exaggerating the power of the state, because it speaks
with the authority of the state outside of which it yields no meaning. Indeed it
affirmatively uses the power of the state to sanction and punish.

And unlike Revolution that presages a clarity of meaning of what the subject of the
Revolution wants, the “rule of law” relies on written legal texts, created through

legislative compromise. Ambiguity, gaps and conflicts are inherent to the text and

interpretation with all its frustrating pursuit of the “intent of the legislature” is what
haunts the subject of the “rule of law’.

Revolution-Transition-Rule of Law

If all went well with Revolution, the common wisdom says, the transition from

Revolution to Rule of law would have been smooth, with the demands of revolution

embodied in new legislative texts and an honest independent judiciary. So what puts
Egypt at this conjunction of Revolution and Rule of law, stuck right in the teasing
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middle, its various contending parties using the “Rule of law” to litigate

“Revolution”, and “Revolution” to put “Rule of law” on trial? Is the trouble with the
Egyptian Revolution itself that it did not yield a smooth transition? Perhaps one
shouldn’t call it a revolution after all? Is the trouble with the very notion of

“transition”, the assumption that Revolution yields a transition that is in effect an
interruption in time and situation that eventually yields new legal texts and new

judiciary? Or is the trouble with the idea of the “Rule of law” itself and the imagined
respite it would deliver the Revolutionary once it is in full bloom?

What is interesting, if not indeed ironic, is that the transitional situation in which

Egypt finds itself, which is experienced as persecutory, is in some ways the envy of

countries where the rule of law is “thick” and dominant. To be able to judge the “rule
of law” by the universals of Revolution, not so remote in memory and not made
invisible by legislative texts, is an enviable position to be in. To have law

appropriated and mastered with confidence by the layman whereby the role of

“judiciary” is eliminated altogether is the dream of progressives in such countries!
One might push the “critical” point even further and argue that the idea that the

“rule of law” will deliver a respite for the revolutionary and a resting place for the

“Revolution” is itself a form of false consciousness. No such place exists. One can get
an honest and independent judiciary, and legislation passed by an elected

legislature and a “counter revolutionary” situation prevails nevertheless. Enemies

of revolution can as easily sneak right back through “proper” law and independent
judiciary as they can through military uniforms and anti-riot gears. And once they

do, they are in fact much more tightly locked in having acquired the legitimacy of the
“rule of law”. At the end of the day, aren’t visible displays of unjust power better
than those that are invisible?

“Revolution/transition/Rule of law” is an expression of a time sequence that has

captured the imagination of Egyptian revolutionaries. There is nothing unrealistic or
irrational about it. Put in simplest and most vulgar of terms, it is an expression of a
perfectly legitimate desire to have a proper and functioning state. No sooner than
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Revolution “sizes up” the power of the authoritarian state, showing the limits of its
projected authority and the hollowness of its inside through its acts of resistance

and challenge, than it seeks to seize state power to prop it up again, this time on new
terms, the terms of the “rule of law’. The trouble is that this time sequence, rational
and realistic, is also highly indeterminate. The indeterminacy plagues each one of
its terms: Revolution, transition, Rule of Law as events that are disruptive of time

and situation. The indeterminacy of the first term “Revolution” implicates the other
two terms making the whole sequence indeterminate.

Indeterminate Revolution?

As soon as we ask the question: was what happened in Egypt a “Revolution”? We

find that our interpretation of the time sequence in the aftermath of the overthrow
of Mubarak, or what I call here “transition”, indispensible to our answer whatever
that answer might be. And if that time sequence was pregnant with law and
legalism(s), then our interpretation of that seem to also play a role too.

A possible answer to the question is: What happened in Egypt was not a Revolution,
after all! Yes the spectacle of the crowds in Tahrir, persistent, passionate, creative

and brave was stunning and wondrous; the moment in which Mubarak in the face of

the crowds’ persistent chants “Leave” finally conceded “his throne” was indeed
spectacular, but all that didn’t amount to a “Revolution”. What happened was

simply a “tap” on an already imploding state. The failure of the police to contain the

gathering crowds was a signal of the weakness of the state, already apace for several

years before that crowning moment of spectacle. The crowds simply witnessed what
those administering the state had known all along and considered its collapse to be
a question of time only. Why a “tap” on an imploding state doesn’t amount to

“Revolution”? Well, because it had no “proper” subject. While a kind of media-

generated consensus on calling it a revolution quickly formed, there was no “force”
that could step up briskly and forcefully after the fall of Mubarak to “draw out” the
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consequences of the chant “Bread, Liberty and Social Justice”. No force could,
because we have seen with the benefit of time after the fall, that no force did.

There was indeed a group of people who called themselves “The Revolutionary

Bloc” and the interpretation they offered of “Bread, Liberty and Social Justice” which
they often supported with their “bodies” in several altercations with the police in

the aftermath of the overthrow of Mubarak, was most “revolutionary”. But their spin
proved solitary, utopian, overdrawn, unwarranted by the public event that had
happened, namely, state implosion followed by a dictator’s concession. The

“subject” necessary to tap an imploding state was very different from the one

required to create a rupture in situation, in -time. The one requires a condensation
of rage, otherwise diffuse, which quickly finds its release in the achievement of the
object at hand: the removal of the dictator. The other nurtures its resentment and

rage in the service of a universal idea whose consequences it bleeds out over time. It
amounted to a revolutionary demand before the “Revolution”. The crowds had
already departed!

Law in the Shadow of the Fall

If one adopts the pessimistic take on the above interpretation one would have to eye
with suspicion the law-filled time in the aftermath of Fall (of Mubarak). The legal

density of the back and fro that I described in the opening paragraph of this paper

can only be “suspect” law. It is so in a double sense. It is neither a species of the Rule
of Law nor is it a species of Revolution. It is not of the former because it cannot
effectively project state authority without which the Rule of Law may not be

performed persuasively. The state has imploded and left the void in its tracks. To the
contrary all those law-acts appear like a manic scramble for state authority, a lot of
law to make up for the absence of the state. As if the aggregate of state (legal) acts,

be it in the form of law or legal decisions, can bring an imploded state back to life!

13

Arguably, the scramble for the state, the desire to put the fragments back together,

against the background of the Fall (rather than the Revolution), can be attributed to
both those who “tapped” the imploding state and those whose authority with the
implosion was lost. For the latter, legalizing their power, even as a thin veneer as

was the case under the dictatorship, was too hard to resist. Indeed, it was business

as usual. For the former, the “sizing up” of the state may have been so terrifying that
the dread of the void soon displaced the pleasure of overthrowing a dictator. The

desire for state authority quickly reinstated itself. The one maybe acting in sinister
fashion claiming power back through law while the other well intentioned looking
for good authority through law and litigation; but it is this conjoint desire for the
state that fills the post-Fall time with dense law-acts.

This kind of Rule of Law performance would take place outside the constraint of the
universal: no Revolution, after all, had taken place. A dictator fell revealing the

weakness of the state he presided over. This was no productive rupture that would
set forth a new situation working under the constraints of different norms.

Authoritarian law can be reinstated punctured by certain legal concessions with a
view to accommodating the condensed-now-diffuse rage of the demonstrators.

Military trials of demonstrators can continue while a reorganization of the police

and the Ministry of Interior is conceded to the public to make it more “transparent”
and less arbitrary. Trial of the fallen dictator takes place but in civilian courts and

only for crimes committed in Tahrir. The dictator is “under arrest” but is spending
his time in a military hospital for “health reasons’. The usual practice of managing

the state is back: splitting the difference and then splitting again within the original
split, and so forth. This time the difference is being split between the two pressing
considerations of on the one side the exigencies of cementing state power back
without radically reorganizing the terms of its practice, and on the other

accommodating public discontent. The absence of revolution makes resurfacing of

this state managerial style less outrageous though not yet of course, given its manic
overcompensating quality. Repeating with intensity what had been the case before
produces an air of urgency rather than normalcy. A state had just imploded!
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Law in the Shadow of Revolution

The above interpretation can be given a more nuanced and optimistic spin by

insisting that while all the above was true, that Tahrir was no more than a tap on an
imploding state and that the revolutionary bloc that emerged afterwards was guilty
of an “overbearing” reading of the flash event of Tahrir, that nevertheless this

reading could match the event through willful operation and diligent political work
that insists on projecting Revolution backwards and forwards: “It was a Revolution
therefore it is therefore it will be!” By tirelessly drawing out in the minds of

Egyptians the consequences of that moment in Tahrir when they had “sized up” the
power of their state, insisting that the distance between “sizing up” the state and

ceasing it was a very short one, and that Egyptians can run, walk or crawl that one
last mile, but that they do is a must. Revolution it will be!

If one adopts this more optimistic spin of what happened in Tahrir one would have

to see the law-filled time in the aftermath of the “Revolution” as more complex with

the conflict of interests between those who lost and those who gained heightened as
each is now laboring under the constraint of the universal unleashed by

“Revolution”. For those who lost, law becomes a means through which the universal
is blocked. The tendency of the “Rule of Law’ to siphon off any political influence
outside its domain is most convenient for those purposes. For those, the

introduction of law, any law: good law, bad law, early on in the process is a means

for derailing the normative pressure of the universal given the self-referential and
extreme textuality of the law. The faster one moves towards law and legal

performances, the sooner one departs from revolutionary times. The latter calls

upon the state to respect the radical egalitarianism of the collective in Tahrir, the

former counters with its own textually constrained notion of egalitarianism which
will inevitably fall short.
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For those who won the move to law is desired in a double but ultimately

contradictory sense. On the one hand, the “Rule of Law” with all that it implies is one
of the enunciated goals of the Revolution. As I mentioned earlier, the desire for the
“Rule of Law” is part of the desire for a decent and functioning state that most

Egyptians covet. On the other hand, law is seen as a means to utilize the porous

quality of the law at this early stage to infuse it with the universal to which it lives in
temporal proximity, to insist that that law should echo as much as possible the

commands of the universal and that its textuality should be interpreted under its

constraint. These are contradictory desires on the part of the revolutionary camp

because to have the one, politico-phobic Rule of Law, they need to give up the latter,
law constrained by the universal, and vice versa.

To have the “Rule of Law” in a state that labored for decades under dictatorships is

itself so revolutionary that attributes of revolution are given to those of Rule of Law
mistakenly and in idealizing fashion. Beginnings as presaging birth of the new have
their political aesthetics and collapsing differences through idealization might be
one of them!

Note how attributing the quality of “Revolution” to the removal of Mubarak and the
implosion of the authoritarian state sharpens the degree of conflict between the

forces of the old and the forces of the new and makes law-acts that would otherwise

appear as run-of-the mill, difference splitting, state management styles appear more

assaultive and deliberate. For they become more than a scramble for state authority,
they are attempts at containing the revolutionary tide. Given the inherently

conservative nature of the Rule of Law as a sphere that blocks the political, the early

entry into the Rule of Law domain very soon after the event of Tahrir would seem to
transport political conflicts yet to be worked out in the domain of the political into

the more secure (for the old forces) domain of the law. Not because the judiciary is
not independent, still acting to please the old political forces as the Revolutionary
wisdom has it, but because it might choose to become independent from politics
precisely then by blocking off the influence of the Revolution as an event that
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constraints its interpretation of law. By doing that it would be most faithful to its

judicialness and therefore most persuasive in its Rule of law performances. On the
revolutionary side, on the other hand, this early immersion into law while it

promises teasingly of a Rule of Law coveted universe, it amounts to an invitation to
law before the maturation of the universals of the Revolution. The worst that could
happen to Revolution, with weak revolutionary subjects, whose Revolution teeters
between self-inflicted implosion and revolutionary act, is to be inducted into the

Rule of Law before they have worked out the Revolutionary implications of their act.
It is the entry into the ‘written” when they have barely had time to enunciate the
words of Revolution.

Law in the Shadow of Democracy

That what happened in Tahrir was indeed a revolution but a very specific one, a

popular Revolution for democracy, is by far the most popular interpretation of the
events in Tahrir. This interpretation while insisting on the revolutionary nature of

the Tahrir events, limits the range of the universals to be read out of them into one,
namely, “Democracy”. Indeed, what else could be read out of the toppling of a
dictator but the desire for political freedom, the freedom to choose one’s

representatives? Democracy according to this interpretation enters as a mediating

term between Revolution and the Rule of Law whereby the former is overridden by

the choices democracy yield (the populace elect their political representatives): they
come to stand in for whatever revolutionary potential there was; and the latter is
treated as a species of democracy (elected representatives pass laws that are
applied by an independent judiciary) and one of its organic effects.

Democracy is inserted here with its own logic that is independent of that of
Revolution and the Rule of Law. A Revolution for Democracy is one that

subordinates all its potential universals to the one of “choice”. “Choice by the

greatest number” is its most privileged term that functions as its sole universal. The

arrangements that put democracy in place are designed to mine the consequences of
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this one solitary universal: “choice”. It is form to Revolution’s content; procedure to
Revolution’s substance; nihilism to Revolution’s faith. Nothing to scoff at as choice
is an expression of freedom the practice of which is highly revolutionary in the
aftermath of a dictatorship.

Perhaps the most corrosive effect Democracy has on Revolution is that the

democratic choice by the populace comes to “seal” the otherwise indeterminate

events in Tahrir by offering their own retrospective interpretation of those events.

That their choice might fall on a party (the Muslim Brotherhood) that had “hedged”
Tahrir rather than participated un-ambivalently in it, one whose reaction to those
events could best be described as “obscure” and at worst antagonistic, is even the

more sobering for those insisting on flying a narrative-balloon above Tahrir with the
word REVOLUTION inscribed on it. Alarming still is the way the democratic choice
suggests that what had happened was more of “tap on an imploding state” rather

than Revolution – the tectonic plates moved and the next political force standing in
line popped up, before they settled down again. No universals were reported from
the scene.

While on the other side the Rule of Law is considered as an organic effect of the

practice of Democracy, the latter can have no less of a corrosive effect on the Rule of
Law, seen as its twin, than it does on Revolution. The legalization of dictatorial rule,
or law as a means to practice authoritarian governance, was without doubt a

burdensome legacy that Egyptians seem happy to see go with the departure of

Mubarak. But the choice of the populace can turn and negate itself quite willingly by
choosing a supreme authority such as God to oversee their worldly choices. While

the legislative machinery produced by the first elections has not yet yielded enough

legislation for us to judge how Rule of Law under the reign of Democracy will fare in
Egypt, there are indications that unelected institutions such as Al-Azhar will be

given supreme authority over Parliament to pass Sharia muster on laws passed in

earthly democratic institutions. This is no less of a Rule of Law except that it’s one
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whereby the worldly lawgiver has delegated willingly (some of) its powers to

another for guidance.

While the choice of Democracy can have a double corrosive effect: one

retrospectively on how to understand the events of Tahrir and one prospectively on
the Rule of Law, all of this is not altogether without limit. A commitment to

Democracy and the Rule of Law in the aftermath of the toppling of a dictator would
seem to drag with it a constellation of ideas, universally settled, about what they

mean. The uneasy relationship between Democracy and Rights is a staple of such

constellations, inherited from Revolutions other times in other places. If the choice
of Democracy has the power to eliminate other universals from Tahrir it

nevertheless has to contend with universals imprinted in the institutions of
Democracy, “Rights” being the most basic. This would allow for a possible

destabilization of Democratic choice and its legislative embodiments this time not
from an outside of Democracy, Revolution in Tahrir, but from its deep inside

through the settled legal traces of Revolutions elsewhere that have become legally
“universalized”.

“Rights” open to interpretation and allowing for possible constellations of “liberties
and entitlements”, that move from radical to liberal on the political spectrum, can
function as the medium for the return of Revolution on different terms (now

speaking the language of universals). This time it comes from inside a settled

discourse with its debates already drawn out in other contexts. It can become

legitimate oppositional language diffuse revolutionary forces can latch on to, to

compensate for their initial weakness. The drafting of a new Constitution after the
fall of the dictator becomes this compensatory event that through the language of

Rights utilized now with some urgency, given the particular “choice” of Democracy,
allows for the universals of Tahrir to be revisited, recited, and rehashed.
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Conclusion

By the time I finished writing this paper, Morsi, the Muslim Brotherhood first

democratically elected president of Egypt had disbanded SCAF (Supreme Council of

Armed Forces). SCAF had taken over the state in the aftermath of Mubarak’s fall and
assumed the role of the caretaker of the transition to Democracy. SCAF’s rule was
considered highly suspect given the heightened resort to law to cement military

control over the country. SCAF was generally regarded as representing the network

of interests that were prominent under Mubarak now seeking to re-establish power
on new terms. The ease with which the dismantlement of SCAF took place and the

almost complete absence of opposition to the fact is hard to interpret at this point.
Some argue that Morsi’s act is tantamount to finishing an unfinished revolution. A

daring act that would not have been possible if it were not that the spirit of “Tahrir”
and the multiple violent encounters with the army by the revolutionary forces in its
aftermath. It was the Revolution that inspired, produced, and directed its own final
act. Others opine that while the political representative of the interests has been

removed, the network itself has not been eliminated. They argue that the Muslim

Brotherhood seeks to replace its own network in its stead or alternatively seek to
edge its own network inside the old one and create a new “partnership”. This

analysis relies on the fact that the Brotherhood is adopting the same economic

policies of the Mubarak regime (with minor differences) and is already showing

signs of authoritarian control over political opposition. The fact that such policies
will aggravate the already difficult lives of the struggling masses and threaten to

send them back on the streets again with a renewed round of repression from the
state in response, means that little has changed in Egypt.

Such kind of arguments raise the specter that haunts Egypt and which I have tried to
capture in this paper, namely, the indeterminateness of what happened in Egypt
that led to the fall of Mubarak, a question that cannot be settled without an

interpretation of the events that followed the fall and the law-acts that permeated
this time sequence. One can either use the language of “revolution-over-time” or
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revolution-counter-revolution-back-to-revolution sequence or “popular revolution”
to describe what happened and remains unfolding. What causes the

indeterminatness is what the left has come to call “ the weakness of the

Revolutionary forces”, or what I call the ambiguity of the Subject of Revolution. It is

my view that Egypt lives within the gravitational field of Implosion, Revolution, and
Popular Revolution for Democracy, all at the same time and this indeterminateness
will not be settled anytime soon.

21

